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We study the risks of validator reuse across multiple services in a restaking protocol. We characterize the robust security of a restaking network as a function of the buffer between the costs and profits from attacks. For example, our results imply that if attack costs always exceed attack profits by 10%, then a sudden loss of .1% of the overall stake (e.g., due to a software error) cannot result in the ultimate loss of more than 1.1% of the overall stake. We also provide local analogs of these overcollateralization conditions and robust security guarantees that apply specifically for a target service or coalition of services. All of our bounds on worst-case stake loss are the best possible. Finally, we bound the maximum-possible length of a cascade of attacks. Our results suggest measures of robustness that could be exposed to the participants in a restaking protocol. We also suggest polynomial-time computable sufficient conditions that can proxy for these measures. 

We prove novel algorithmic guarantees for several online problems in the smoothed analysis model. In this model, at each time step an adversary chooses an input distribution with density function bounded above pointwise by \(\tfrac{1}{\sigma }\)times that of the uniform distribution; nature then samples an input from this distribution. Here, σ is a parameter that interpolates between the extremes of worst-case and average case analysis. Crucially, our results hold foradaptiveadversaries that can base their choice of input distribution on the decisions of the algorithm and the realizations of the inputs in the previous time steps. An adaptive adversary can nontrivially correlate inputs at different time steps with each other and with the algorithm’s current state; this appears to rule out the standard proof approaches in smoothed analysis. This paper presents a general technique for proving smoothed algorithmic guarantees against adaptive adversaries, in effect reducing the setting of an adaptive adversary to the much simpler case of an oblivious adversary (i.e., an adversary that commits in advance to the entire sequence of input distributions). We apply this technique to prove strong smoothed guarantees for three different problems:(1)Online learning: We consider the online prediction problem, where instances are generated from an adaptive sequence of σ-smooth distributions and the hypothesis class has VC dimensiond. We bound the regret by\(\tilde{O}(\sqrt {T d\ln (1/\sigma)} + d\ln (T/\sigma))\)and provide a near-matching lower bound. Our result shows that under smoothed analysis, learnability against adaptive adversaries is characterized by the finiteness of the VC dimension. This is as opposed to the worst-case analysis, where online learnability is characterized by Littlestone dimension (which is infinite even in the extremely restricted case of one-dimensional threshold functions). Our results fully answer an open question of Rakhlin et al. [64].(2)Online discrepancy minimization: We consider the setting of the online Komlós problem, where the input is generated from an adaptive sequence of σ-smooth and isotropic distributions on the ℓ₂unit ball. We bound the ℓ_∞norm of the discrepancy vector by\(\tilde{O}(\ln ^2(\frac{nT}{\sigma }))\). This is as opposed to the worst-case analysis, where the tight discrepancy bound is\(\Theta (\sqrt {T/n})\). We show such\(\mathrm{polylog}(nT/\sigma)\)discrepancy guarantees are not achievable for non-isotropic σ-smooth distributions.(3)Dispersion in online optimization: We consider online optimization with piecewise Lipschitz functions where functions with ℓ discontinuities are chosen by a smoothed adaptive adversary and show that the resulting sequence is\(({\sigma }/{\sqrt {T\ell }}, \tilde{O}(\sqrt {T\ell }))\)-dispersed. That is, every ball of radius\({\sigma }/{\sqrt {T\ell }}\)is split by\(\tilde{O}(\sqrt {T\ell })\)of the partitions made by these functions. This result matches the dispersion parameters of Balcan et al. [13] for oblivious smooth adversaries, up to logarithmic factors. On the other hand, worst-case sequences are trivially (0,T)-dispersed.¹ 

We consider the impact of trading fees on the profits of arbitrageurs trading against an automated marker marker (AMM) or, equivalently, on the adverse selection incurred by liquidity providers due to arbitrage. We extend the model of Milionis et al. [2022] for a general class of two asset AMMs to both introduce fees and discrete Poisson block generation times. In our setting, we are able to compute the expected instantaneous rate of arbitrage profit in closed form. When the fees are low, in the fast block asymptotic regime, the impact of fees takes a particularly simple form: fees simply scale down arbitrage profits by the fraction of time that an arriving arbitrageur finds a profitable trade. 

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model of active block producers that have their own private valuations for blocks (representing, for example, additional value derived from the application layer). The block producer surplus in our model can be interpreted as one of the more common colloquial meanings of the phrase "maximal extractable value (MEV)." We first prove that transaction fee mechanism design is fundamentally more difficult with active block producers than with passive ones: With active block producers, no non-trivial or approximately welfare-maximizing transaction fee mechanism can be incentive-compatible for both users and block producers. These results can be interpreted as a mathematical justification for augmenting transaction fee mechanisms with additional components such as order flow auctions, block producer competition, trusted hardware, or cryptographic techniques. We then consider a more fine-grained model of block production that more accurately reflects current practice, in which we distinguish the roles of "searchers" (who actively identify opportunities for value extraction from the application layer and compete for the right to take advantage of them) and "proposers" (who participate directly in the blockchain protocol and make the final choice of the published block). Searchers can effectively act as an "MEV oracle" for a transaction fee mechanism, thereby enlarging the design space. Here, we first consider a TFM that is inspired by how searchers have traditionally been incorporated into the block production process, with each transaction effectively sold off to a searcher through a first-price auction. We then explore the TFM design space with searchers more generally, and design a mechanism that circumvents our impossibility results for TFMs without searchers. Our mechanism (the "SAKA" mechanism) is incentive-compatible (for users, searchers, and the block producer), sybil-proof, and guarantees roughly 50% of the maximum-possible welfare when transaction sizes are small relative to block sizes. We conclude with a matching negative result: even when transaction sizes are small, no DSIC and sybil-proof deterministic TFM can guarantee more than 50% of the maximum-possible welfare.